Kherson offensive?

So it remains absolutely true that Russian propaganda bots always lie? Not very surprising but it is nice to hear that remains infallibly true.

 

Be as sarcastic as you wish. No. The Ukrainian salute is different. They begin their salute in the same position as Americans (palm down), the motion of the salute is different. Americans snap the hand down to their side. Ukraine snaps it out at a 45 degree angle (like the Germans) but the hand is perfectly vertical palm forward. India starts like the British (palm forward). British motion is out and down finishing with arm pointed to the side and down (45 degrees). India's motion is out and up 45 degrees (like the Nazi's only finishing directly to the side) whereas the Nazi's is up and out 45 degrees straight forward. Nazi's start with thumb to heart, motion is then up and out at 45 degrees hand in line with arm, straight forward. All slightly different salutes. What is important is the meaning. Ukrainian soldiers salute as a sign of respect and allegiance to Ukraine, not NAZI Germany.

As for your disinformation about "nazis(sic) know they have a week to commit atrocities", CNN is not the only news agency in the world. CNN isn't even a good news source. So while CNN is not permitted into certain recently liberated regions, the others are. This is because they failed to honor their promise not to air content depicting Ukrainian soldiers in such regions for 6 days. I hardly think a 6 day waiting period permits "atrocities" to occur undocumented. It is a fair and previously agreed upon compromise to give media transparent access, yet provide Ukraine a means of delaying such content long enough for their troops to avoid having their positions compromised.

 

Yes. Their complaint reminds me of the time Geraldo Rivera on live TV while embedded with American forces drew a map in the sand with a stick. What he drew was two intersecting lines saying, "there are these two rivers which intersect here. We are 2 miles away from that intersection here". Then made a mark in the sand where they were located. There are only 2 rivers in Iraq? What an idiot. He got booted out, but later claimed he voluntarily left.

In this case it is perhaps worse as the images contain the actual GPS locations and show Ukrainian forces present. Might as well carry around a GPS transponder linked with the Kremlin.

 

The small town of Chornobaivka, a symbol of Ukrainian invincibility, is located in the Kherson Oblast.

At the military airfield in Chornobaivka, the Armed Forces of Ukraine defeated and destroyed ruZZian equipment and ruZZian terrorists 26 times. The fightings for Chornobaivka lasted from February 2022 to November 2022.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Chornobaivka_attacks

Slava Ukraini!

 

Heh, you're the Nikole Hannah-Jones of the Monroe Doctrine!

 

Descent to ad hominem is a marker for defeat.
You lost.

 

So this is not the nazi salute? I see. Just the ukrainian nazi salute....damn learn something every day



And that's not a nazi swastika....that's a ukrainian nazi swastika

And that insignia is not the Nazi SS Waffen 14th Division...it's the ukrainian nazi SS Waffen 14th Division

 

Russian disinformation, professionally staged.

 

It usually is.

 

This is fairly old news. Ukraine is currently within 2-3 weeks of taking Melitopol. Russian forces are already preparing to retreat beyond defensive positions they are hastily erecting southwest of Melitopol to stall the inevitable advance to Novooleksiivka. Should Ukrainian forces control Novooleksiivka earlier than anticipated (due to the sudden collapse of Russian forces along the thin defensive line) retreat from Kherson will not be possible. This would result in massive losses in Southern Kherson and the kill or capture of 30-60k elite Russian forces. All attempts by Russia to adequately supply these forces have all but been abandoned. Russian defense ministers are on the cusp of a hard decision. Mobilizing more Russian troops into the region will only make resupply needs greater and may only serve to increase the number of Russian soldiers in jeopardy of being trapped in Southern Kherson. In November a similar conundrum was resolved by Russian command deciding to flood Kherson City with untrained new recruits arriving with no equipment whatsoever. These new recruits were expected to utilize the equipment being left behind by veteran forces hastily withdrawing. Since these new arrivals were given no equipment, this avoided the need to place strains on Russian logistics but resulted in devastating losses among these "one-use" newly conscripted units. Much of the equipment left for them to utilize was in disrepair and in most cases not operable. Not even rations were provided as they had little hope of surviving more than a few days, and once the veterans withdrew, they blew the bridges across the Dniper so these conscripts had no ability to retreat.

Russian forces have been constructing defensive positions along the M-14 highway for several weeks now. These defenses are largely complete and will likely serve as the next defensive line the Russians fall back on. This line is hinged at Melitopol, indicating Russian command has already resigned itself to the loss of Melitopol and virtually the entirety of Kherson. To prevent the destruction of the M-14 hinge it is anticipated the hinge access bridges (Southwest of Melitopol) over the river deltas will be destroyed and almost certainly already have demolitions in place. Imaging indicates several runway assets currently under Russian control West of Melitopol are evacuating functional air assets. Explosions have been reported which may indicate air assets in disrepair are being destroyed in place to avoid falling into Ukrainian hands (although they could also be the result of Partisan attacks). Should this hinge in the line fail to hold it is unlikely even the veteran forces (left to their own devices) will be able to escape back into Crimea. This isn't entirely out of the question as the troops preparing the defensive hinge are already poorly supplied. It is likely Russian command is banking on the decision to blow the river crossings will provide enough time to at least withdraw their elite forces into Crimea while conscripts provide cover for their withdrawal.

 

I agree with much of you analysis but I disagree on the time frame. 2-3 weeks is likely entirely to optimistic as existing forces have to refit and repair, additional units have to be trained and equipped in NATO countries to replace loses, units have to be moved into position, men in those units have to be drilled and taught the combat plans, extra reserve stores of munitions must be put into place for ready access at the front, food and fuel must be stockpiled close to the front, and lastly (but not least) the ground must hard freeze as the mud in Southern Ukraine is epically bad for all motorized and even tracked vehicles.

Oh, and let us not forget that Ukraine will want weeks if not months of time to bomb everything with in reach to allow Russian forces to run out of critical supplies such as ammo, food, and fuel.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• Russia is attempting to capitalize on the Western desire for negotiations to create a dynamic in which Western officials feel obliged to make preemptive concessions to lure Russia to the table.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated as the basis for negotiations precisely the same demands that the Russian Foreign Ministry had made before the February 24 invasion, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitrii Peskov added the further demand that the West recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory.
• Russian forces still pose a threat to Ukrainian energy infrastructure despite the success of Ukrainian air defenses.
• Additional Western air defense systems are prompting the Russian pro-war community to question the Russian air campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.
• Russian officials are setting conditions to negotiate the demilitarization of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), an agreement upon which Russia would likely renege and that would not eliminate or diminish the ongoing threat to the ZNPP.
• Ukrainian forces made localized breakthroughs southwest and northwest of Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued to make minimal advances in the Bakhmut area and conduct offensive operations in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area.
• Russian forces may be struggling to properly allocate and deploy forces in rear areas in southern Ukraine due to Ukrainian strikes.
• Poor logistics, unruly mobilized personnel, and domestic protests continue to prevent the Kremlin from achieving the goals of partial mobilization.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to attempt to mask military development projects in occupied territories for no obvious reason. . . . .

Russia is attempting to capitalize on the Western desire for negotiations to create a dynamic in which Western officials feel pressed to make preemptive concessions to lure Russia to the negotiating table. Russian President Vladimir Putin held an hour-long telephone conversation with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on December 2 in which Putin falsely stated that Western financial and military aid to Ukraine creates a situation in which the Ukrainian government outright rejects talks between Moscow and Kyiv and called upon Scholz to reconsider Germany’s approach regarding developments in Ukraine.[1] Scholz stated that any diplomatic solution to the conflict in Ukraine must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory.[2] The Putin-Scholz call corresponded with a diplomatic overture from US President Joe Biden on December 1 in which Biden stated that he is prepared to speak with Putin if the Russian president is looking for a way to end the war, although Biden acknowledged that he has no immediate plans to do so.[3]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Biden’s comments on December 2 stating that Biden seems to be demanding the removal of Russian forces from Ukraine as a precondition for negotiations and said that the “special military operation” would continue.[4] Peskov added that America’s reluctance to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories significantly complicates the search for common ground in possible negotiations.[5] . . .

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces made localized breakthroughs southwest and northwest of Kreminna on December 2. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances in the forests south of Kreminna and have reached the outskirts of Chervonopopivka (about 10km northwest of Kreminna).[25] The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces have intensified their counteroffensives along the entire frontline and in the area of the Svatove-Kreminna highway. Luhansk Oblast Administration head Serhiy Haidai vaguely noted that Ukrainian forces are “very close” to Kreminna and stated that Ukrainian forces “visited” the Kreminska power substation in the vicinity of the settlement.[26] Haidai added that the weather is finally changing on the Svatove-Kreminna frontline, noting that Ukrainian forces will soon be able to improve their maneuvers as the mud fully freezes in the area.[27] . . .

 

Reality or misdirection?

After Kherson, Ukraine’s military ponders new push south and east
A logical step for Ukraine would be to press south through the Zaporizhzhia region and sever the "land bridge" between Russia and Crimea.
By Samantha Schmidt and Serhii Korolchuk

 

My timeline estimates are based on imagery. In the past 3 weeks about half the ground necessary has been taken. My estimate is therefore linear and could be off due to variances in the rate at which advances are made. Russian forces in this area are under increasing supply strain. Hypothermia may be as big an issue as combat. Recently 2 Russian soldiers were recorded in the act of committing suicide rather than suffer death by hypothermia. This would seem to be a rare sample, so it's likely the actual numbers are many times greater. Fighting intensity hasn't been high, so the need to soften up may be unnecessary.

Discontent with Russian occupation in Crimea is becoming more evident and will only increase once HIMARS are within range of the Kirch bridge and all resupply capability it lost.

 

And Yes. My initial estimates were sometime in January for just this reason. Information is entirely absent as to the state of supplies Ukrainian logistics are able to relocate into the area. Apparently, based solely on Ukrainian operations in Zaporhizhia, the supply situation is better than I presumed. The advance on Melitopol appears to be underway. IMHO Melitopol may fall by Xmas or the New Year. I could easily be off. Concrete information is non-existent. Could be as late as the end of January even. But it will almost certainly occur in the near future.

 

Being factually correct means...I'm right!

 

Factually, you're incorrect.
You lost.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 3

Click here to read the full report.
Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces reportedly reached the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River across from Kherson City.
• French President Emmanuel Macron amplified Russian information operations about the need for NATO to consider “security guarantees” to be given to Russia during putative negotiations in a televised interview on December 3.
• Conditions in eastern Ukraine are likely becoming more conducive to a higher pace of operations as winter sets in.
• The Russian and Belarusian Ministers of Defense met in Minsk likely to further strengthen bilateral security ties between Russia and Belarus.
• Ukrainian forces likely continue to advance northwest of Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian authorities reportedly evacuated Russian collaborators from Oleshky.
• The Russian National Guard’s (Rosgvardia) Organizational and Staff Department confirmed that mobilization continues despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of the formal end of partial mobilization on October 31.
• Russian authorities are continuing to use judicial measures to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories. . . .

Ukrainian forces reportedly reached the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River across from Kherson City. The Ukrainian “Carlson” volunteer special air intelligence unit posted footage on December 3 of Ukrainian servicemen traversing the Dnipro River in boats, reaching a wooden marina-like structure on the east bank, and raising a Ukrainian flag on a tower near the shore.[1] Special Unit “Carlson” reported that this is the first instance of a Ukrainian flag flying over the east bank of the Dnipro River and emphasized this operation will provide a springboard for subsequent Ukrainian operations on the east bank.[2] If confirmed, this limited Ukrainian incursion onto the east bank could open avenues for Ukrainian forces to begin to operate on the east bank. As ISW has previously reported, observed Russian fortifications on the left bank indicate Russian forces are anticipating Ukrainian offensive actions on the east bank and have been constructing defensive lines south of the Dnipro River.[3] The establishment of positions along the eastern riverbank will likely set conditions for future Ukrainian offensive operations into occupied Kherson Oblast if Ukrainian troops choose to pursue this line of advance in the south. . . .

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian force concentration areas and logistics nodes in Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian force concentration on December 2 in the vicinity of Starobilsk, killing 14 Russian personnel and wounding 30.[29] Russian sources claimed on December 3 that Ukrainian forces struck Khoroshe, Starobilsk, Svatove, and Novochervone in Luhansk Oblast with HIMARS rockets.[30] . . .

Ukrainian forces continued interdiction efforts against Russian concentration areas in the rear of Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes on Melitopol and Vasylivka on December 2 wounded up to 270 Russian personnel.[44] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, stated that residents of Mykhailivka (north of Melitopol) reported loud explosions near the village, likely near a Russian concentration area.[45] Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops are massing near the Zaporizhia frontline for an attack into the Russian rear.[46] Russian forces continued routine fire along the line of contact in western Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts and notably conducted missile and rocket strikes on Zaporizhzhia City and Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast.[47] . . .

 

Unlike Russia's untrained and poorly equipped conscripts Ukrainian soldiers have been provided with all the necessary gear and equipment plus they have largely been trained by western military establishments. Damaged or captured equipment regularly gets repair and reconditioned in western factories while critical supplies of food, fuel, and ammo flow in.

https://youtube.com/shorts/7S_qj5lJux8?feature=share

Ukraine is doing all the fighting and bleeding for their homeland but the west helps with training, equipment, and financing. Not to mention intel.

 

Ukraine Conflict Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4

Click here to read the full report.

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian officials have indicated that Ukrainian forces will continue counteroffensive operations over the upcoming winter.
• Ukraine’s ability to maintain the military initiative depends on Ukrainian forces continuing counteroffensive operations in the winter of 2022-2023.
• Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the directions of Kreminna and Svatove.
• Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations around Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
• Groups of mobilized Russian soldiers continue to disrupt Russian force generation efforts with refusals to fight, insubordination, and defiance.
• Russian forces likely publicly executed residents in occupied Luhansk Oblast on accusations of partisan activity. . . .

Ukrainian officials have indicated that Ukrainian forces plan to continue offensive operations over the coming winter to capitalize on recent battlefield successes and prevent Russian forces from regaining the battlefield initiative. Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Eastern Group Serhii Cherevatyi stated on December 4 that frozen ground enables heavy wheeled and tracked vehicles to advance and that Ukrainian forces are preparing such vehicles for winter operations.[1] Cherevatyi also stated that low-quality mobilized recruits and Wagner Group personnel recruited from Russian prisoners are unprepared for combat in the winter.[2] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on November 20 that those who suggest the winter will pause hostilities “likely never sunbathed in January on the southern coast of Crimea,” suggesting that Ukrainian forces intend to continue counteroffensive operations over the coming winter that contribute toward the goal of retaking Crimea.[3] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Volodymyr Havrylov stated on November 18 that Ukrainian forces will continue to fight in the winter because any type of pause will allow Russian forces to reinforce their units and positions.[4] Ukrainian officials’ prior statements on ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in Kherson Oblast are further evidence that these official statements on winter counteroffensive actions are indicators of continuing counteroffensive operations.[5]

Senior US government officials are mistakenly identifying the optimal window of opportunity for Ukraine to conduct more counteroffensives as the spring rather than winter, despite Ukrainian officials’ statements to the contrary. US Director for National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines assessed on December 3 that the pace of the war in Ukraine will slow over the winter so both sides can refit, resupply, and reconstitute, despite evidence that conditions on the ground favor a renewed offensive and despite the demonstrated tendency of Ukrainian forces to initiate new counteroffensive efforts relatively quickly after the previous effort has culminated.[6]

Ukraine’s ability to maintain the military initiative and continue the momentum of its current operational successes depends on Ukrainian forces continuing to conduct successive operations through the winter of 2022-2023. Russia lost the initiative in summer 2022 after its offensive in Donbas culminated.[7] Ukrainian forces gained and have retained the initiative since August 2022 and have been conducting a series of successful successive operations since then: Ukraine liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast in September, Kherson City in November, and is currently setting conditions for more Ukrainian pushes elsewhere this winter.[8] Successive operations are a key part of Ukraine’s campaign design. A series of successive Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts demonstrates the Ukrainian military‘s remarkable operational planning skill and knowledge of the strengths of Soviet operational art. Soviet operational art emphasizes that militaries can only obtain their strategic objectives through the cumulative operational success of successive operations ideally conducted without operational pauses between them.[9] Recent official Ukrainian statements make clear that Ukraine’s campaign design is designed to allow a series of successive operations to deprive Russia of the initiative, defeat the Russian military, and liberate more Ukrainian territory. . . . .

 

I'm still right, you're still desperate

 

I'm still trying to nap.
You lost.

 

'I have no pity for them': Russian describes fighting against his own


"I'm doing my military and Christian duty. I defend the Ukrainian people. And when Ukraine is free, I will carry my sword to Russia to free it from tyranny."

 

I think we've proven you were wrong. Let's do it again!