Following are excerpts I pulled from the Benghazi hearings of the House, which are posted in full here: http://armedservices.house.gov/inde...ecord_id=17D69AFC-744A-43DA-8BEA-D582975C1277 I am posting this to refute any claims that the State Department is NOT being blamed throughout these hearings. I haven't gotten to the Senate report which supposedly blames State, but I think anyone can clearly see where they are heading from these documents. If you are lazy, just read the italicized part, you will get the picture. They are blaming Ambassador Stevens, Hicks, and possibly Hillary, except for the only statement which mentions her in all 6 documents, which states she was being told everything was under control. But again, sure looks like blame game to me. EXECUTIVE SESSION, BENGHAZI BREIFING (Part 1, Session 1, DoD), House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee On Oversight and Investigations, May 21, 2013: Ms. Tsongas: While very real concerns have been raised about failures on the part of the State Department and Intelligence Community, I hope we can remain focused on the Defense Departments operational response to the attacks here today, as it is our subcommittees prerogative. ---p.6 Ms. Tsongas: Both of these assessments lend credence to the commitment and quick reaction of our Commander in Chief, senior DOD leadership, and men and women in uniform on the night of the attack.---p.7 Mr. Reid: But for those reasons, and again, the back channeled calms all night with the State Department, even Mr. Hicks, the Libyans said we are going to get in control.---p. 63 Mr. Reid: Prior to that action occurring, we may have forces in a country working in a non military operation, but in military support context, and we recognize the chief of missions authority for the day-to-day operations of all U.S. activity in that country, even though we may still retain a military chain of command, UCMJ, resources and these type of things, but we will respect the authority of the chief of mission in sort of day-to-day setting. But for a military operation, that transition order is embedded within the Presidents authority to conduct that operation. ---p. 67 General Roberson: That is a great question, sir, because really, we work with the State Department on security, but the State Department has primary responsibility for the embassy, for members of their teams, and to a large extent, for the security of Americans in the country they are in.---p.65 General Roberson: The State Department has primary responsibility for the security of its embassy and those folks that are in the country.---p.68 Mr. Lamborn: So if I understand correctly and I suspected this all along, but I dont think most Americans actually understand this very clearly, the security of embassy personnel depends on the State Department arrangements that have been made in country ahead of time with the narrow exception of a Marine or half of the Marines who might be stationed at the embassy to protect the embassy from physical attack, either documents or personnel that are coming on to the embassy grounds. So in other words, this DOD wants to be helpful and can and will be helpful where directed by the White House in an instance like this, but otherwise, it is all State Department responsibility. EXECUTIVE SESSION, BENGHAZI BREIFING (Part 1, Session 2, DoD), House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee On Oversight and Investigations, May 21, 2013: Mr. Reid: And again, keep in mind they are telling Secretary Clinton the whole way, we are going to get control, we are going to get control. ---p.47 General Roberson: Sir, for us the chief of mission is the senior American authority in the country What should have happened, if that all played out the way I saw it on TV, then Mr. Hicks should have picked up the phone and called Carter Ham and said, I want I got to talk to you. This team needs to get on this plane. I need them there. That was the agreed upon process.---p.39 General Roberson: The FEST is under the control of the State Department.---p.42 General Roberson: ...but you know, State Department has primary responsibility for security for State Department issues. DoD does not.---p.46 ----- Mr. Turner: Wait a minute. It was a war zone. I mean this is not like, what is happening in Austria or some other place. This is like, you know, you went in and took out Qadhafi. This is a war zone. I mean this is months after a war zone. It just seems as if there would have been greater assets that would have been tasked with post-war zone. ----- Mr. Reid: Although one month before this attack the last element of DoD that was there for the specific purpose of providing security was dismissed by the ambassador, against the recommendation of the combatant commander. Mr. Chaffetz: You said Ambassador Stevens declined more Department of Defense assets.---p.40 ----Mr. Reid: He declined continuing SST is what I said. ----General Roberson: Yeah. ----Mr. Reid: General Ham offered to sustain the SST, and the ambassador said, I dont need the SST anymore. Chairman McKeon: It seems to me there was a State Department failure when they released those troops 30 days before ---p.49 AFRICOM AND SOCAFRICA AND THE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2012, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Jun 26, 2013: Mr. Wittman: can you tell me the military assets that you had tactical control over there in Libya on September 11th?---p.54 ----- General Ham: Yes, sir. It was simply in Libya under combatant command authority were six people. The other military people who were there were in the defense attaché office and operating under normal Defense attaché rules, meaning under the Chief of Mission authority. But there were six Special Operations individuals. LtCol Gibson: The reduced security forces in Tripoli, Libya, and specifically the U.S. Embassy compound, were completely inadequate to secure or defend. This constraint severely limited my options for support to Benghazi.---p.85 Mr. Chaffetz: Was there any expectation that there were other military assets coming to help you in Libya?---p.100 ----- LtCol Gibson: There were indications that there were other assets that were in movement. ----- Mr. Chaffetz: Did you make any requests for additional help? ----- LtCol Gibson: Sir, that the requests had already been made. I was not given a timeline. ----- Mr. Chaffetz: Who made that? Who made the requests? ----- LtCol Gibson: It was my understanding that those requests had gone through DCM Hicks, and also through the Defense Attache. Admiral Losey: What would have been compromised is the only military element that was in Tripoli that had any security expertise whatsoever.---p.111 Ms. Tsongas: Both of these assessments lend credence to the commitment and quick reaction of our Commander in Chief, senior DOD leadership, and men and women in uniform on the night of the attack.---p.6 Ms. Tsongas: I dont know if it was buy phone or in person, but that in those conversations in every instance he did not accept your offer of additional help. I am wondering if you can talk about why ---p.12 ----- General Ham: I am not aware of the internal discussions either at the embassy or between the embassy and Main State as to why the SST was not extended beyond the 3rd of August, and that is not a topic Ambassador Stevens and I discussed. Ms. Tsongas: So absent that formal request, that formalized process, you are left with the decision that the State Department has made about what its security needs might be?---p.14 ----- General Ham: Yes maam. Ms. Tsongas: I think the other thing we have heard over and over again is the deep frustration that so much was dependent upon the State Department requesting, in the lead up to September 11th, recognizing the threat and proactively or working with you and your offer, accepting your offer to put in place more security, but for whatever reasons did not see the need.---p.60 Ms. Tsongas: And then in general, so much of our discussion is focused on how the DOD and State Department interacted. And we keep coming back to the place where it was really the burden was upon the State Department to accept whatever offers of help were provided.---p.129 Ms. Tsongas: And I think through the Accountability Review Board in the close look at all of that, many recommendations have been made. And I think the State Department has recognized its quite a few shortcomings and moving ahead on that.---p.129 Mrs. Roby: When Chairman McKeon asked about the possibility of additional U.S. forces in Libya, before September 11, 2012, you replied, and I am quoting your letter, Neither I nor anyone in my command to my knowledge at the time prior to September 11, 2012 advised formally or informally that the Department of State or any other agency take action to increase security for U.S. personnel in Libya or request increased security for U.S. personnel in Libya. And you said quoting, At no time prior to September 11, 2012, did I or anyone in my command recommend deployment of additional U.S. military forces to Libya due to the threat environment.---p.10 And you also wrote, quoting, I can state with certainty that U.S. Africa Command did not receive any direction to provide U.S. military forces to augment security for U.S. personnel in Libya beyond the expiration of the Site Security Teams mandate through August 3, 2012. And so what I would like to ask you are these still after 8 months your impressions? ----- General Ham: Yes maam, they are. General Ham: And I think the in my mind the most compelling argument that the conclusion is that the one individual in the U.S. government who knew more about security and intelligence in Libya and in Benghazi specifically than anyone else was Ambassador Stevens. And I am convinced, knowing him, while I dont think he was particularly concerned about his own safety ---p.11 General Ham: At the point that it was apparent that the Department of State was not going to seek an extension of the Site Security Team, Ambassador Stevens and I had a discussion about what then should be the right DOD presence in addition to the attaché and the normal embassy team.---p.14 Mr. Conaway: Carter, what was Lieutenant Colonel Gibsons chain of command?---p.29 ----- General Ham: Sir, when he was serving as commander of the Site Security Team he operated under what is directed as Chief of Mission authority. ----- Mr. Conaway: So on the 11th he would have been reporting to at that point in time with the Ambassador in Benghazi, and unaccounted for, Mr. Hicks. ----- General Ham: No, sir. By the 11th of September the Site Security Team had expired, it expired on the 3rd of August. Mr. Chaffetz: So was there ever a request from the Department of State for the Department of Defense for military support in what was happening during the attack.---p.40 ----- General Ham: I am not aware of a request from State to Defense. But I would say, sir, that this was as this situation was unfolding, our primary link from the Africa Command Command Center was through the defense attaché. As the Embassy team, as the country team relocated from the Embassy facility to the annex in Tripoli, the communications were less than ideal to be sure. Mr. Nugent: Whose decision was that to remove that Site Security Team?---p.58 ----- General Ham: And there was not a subsequent request by the State Department to review it. ----- Mr. Nugent: So that would have been the State Departments responsibility to request DOD to provide that Site Security Team? ----- General Ham: That is correct, sir. Mr. Thornberry: But I want to get to this point about the arrangements on the ground for logistical support, ground transportation, and so forth. Is that also subject to the chief-of-missions authority and subject to their arrangements?---p.141 ----- Admiral Losey: I think as a matter of physical practicality, I believe that would be the case. EXECUTIVE SESSION BRIEFING ON BENGHAZI, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, July 31, 2013. Colonel George Bristol, former Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force Trans Sahara: I was present for a briefing in which the U.S. Ambassador was given a full range of options for what SOF could provide to his team...He viewed the overall situation to dictate a measured, sequential approach. He had decided that he would build slowly with regard to military footprint.---p.12 Ms. Tsongas: Both of these assessments lend credence to the commitment and quick reaction of our Commander in Chief, senior DOD leadership, and men and women in uniform on the night of the attack.---p.7 Ms. Tsongas: Number two is I think over in the many hearings that we have had we have learned over and over again that the State Department was in the drivers seat. General Ham testified that he had conversations with the Ambassador, wondering if the Site Security Team shouldnt be extended given the multiple events that were unfolding in Libya. But our Ambassador, tragically for the consequences to him, did not accept the offer of additional help.---p.45 Ms. Speier: All right. So Admiral Mullen said to General Ham that he was inclined to extend the Security Support Team mission, and Ambassador Stevens wanted that mission extended for both security and training purposes, but the State Department official said, quote, Didnt want to be embarrassed by having DOD continue to provide security, unquote.---p.18 Dr. Wenstrup: Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate taking lessons learned and putting some things into action. You know, there was requests from Benghazi for increased security earlier than the attack, like as soon as August, maybe even sooner, and you talked about risk assessments being done. So this request was madethere were requests made to the State Department. Was there a risk assessment done by the State Department before the attack when these requests were made for increased security, or an evaluation of the increased threats?---p.22 --- Mr. Reid: Yeah, I apologize, but I dont know the details of exactly who or what or when was requested, and I have heard in these hearings other people comment, but I dont feel comfortable saying what they did. I believe and I have heard in hearings about additions and security enhancements, for instance, at the temporary mission facility, so I would assume there was assessments and requisitions and things happening, but I dont know the details. --- Dr. Wenstrup: That may be something we should ask the State Department to see if they did that. Thank you for that. Ms. Duckworth: One of the things that I am hearing is that the State Department did not do a good risk assessment in deciding to continue to be in Benghazi.---p.15 EXECUTIVE SESSION, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS FORCE POSTURE IN ANTCIPATION OF SEPTEMBER 12, 2012, (BENGHAZI OVERSIGHT), House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Oct 10, 2013: Mr. Chaffetz: So 13 months later there is no after-action report. Is the short answer to that yes or ---p.40 --- General Dempsey: No, I dont I disagree with that characterization. As I said, the ARB is in effect an institutional --- Mr. Chaffetz: Is there ever an instance where the military had the State Department lead the effort to do an after-action report? Can you give me any other example? --- General Dempsey: The ARB process was actually put in place from previous problems, and we have participated with them in those efforts as well. Mrs. Roby: So in okay, so in August of 2012, the Site Security Team, the SST that you just referenced the 16-person team assigned to the embassy in Tripoli was reduced to four personnel at the State Departments request. And General Ham briefed this subcommittee that AFRICOM offered the State Department to retain a larger force. Were you aware of that at the time ---p.8 --- General Dempsey: No, I was aware of it at the time. Ms. Tsongas: I actually would like to sort of follow up on that issue because I think it is something thats become ever more clear as we have had these hearings, and that is just how much the Department of State and the ambassador who tragically lost his life, how much they really are in the drivers seat.---p.11 Mr. Chaffetz: p. 48 The FEST, the Foreign Emergency Support Team, which is headed by the Department of State but is embedded with people from Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, do you see any value in them? They were never called up in this action. This is a tool, a lever I think that the President of the United States has at his disposal, but they were never called into action, never put into the air. Is there any value in them? Should we just get rid of them?---p.48 --- General Dempsey: You know, Congressman, I dont know why they werent used in any particular place. As you note, they are under the authority of the Department of State. The concept is certainly valid.
Despite any reports by government, the right-wingers blame it all on Obama, so it must be his fault. 100%!
Um, this is a report by the House of Representatives, talking to the commanders of the forces in Africa, as well as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I didn't cut and paste, I hand typed all of that. And that's just what I had categorized under BLAME STATE DEPARTMENT.
Which leads me to an interesting question: What exactly have Republicans taken responsibility for, over the last 6 years or so??? (Really, they so often stand and pontificate over issues... as if they were perfect angels. That is about all I have seen from them.)
I've never voted, and I am no Republican. I just know when my spirit has been damaged, and it was the very night of the Benghazi attacks. I was pissed as soon as I first starting hearing media reports that the attack was a result of a demonstration. I instinctively knew that it was no demonstration, so I knew I was being lied to from moment one. I don't say Obama allowed people to die for votes. I say he allowed my and my fellow Americans spirit to die just a little bit for votes. And I think that was wrong.
I admit there were mistakes made, but they aren't limited to Obama and Clinton. I'm simply fed up with Republicans playing as though they are little 'angels' in all of what's going on, when they surely are not. It's time for them to DO something more constructive. All they seem to do is go after the Obama Administration. That isn't helpful to the American people.
It's the culture. It's a culture about politics. I mean the fact that the FAST team, in the middle of an event in which our ambassador is being dragged through the streets and Navy Seals are dying, were told to undress, and suit up in civilian clothes when they got off the plane speaks to the culture of politics. Whoever told that FAST team to get into civilian clothes doesn't belong in the govt imo.
Well, while I am for investigations at certain levels, I doubt that the average citizen gets the FULL story ever. This is nothing new. But right about now, I feel like the Benghazi issue is being used to DISTRACT the America people from something else. I'm willing to put it aside, at this point.
The blame was laid on the State Dept, more directly, Hillary's State Dept. Then there are fool democrats that want her for president.
Actually, I think they are building a story to put the blame on Ambassador Stevens and DCM Hicks. In all of those pages of those 6 documents, of which I read every word twice, Hillary is only mentioned in one brief line here: Mr. Reid: And again, keep in mind they are telling Secretary Clinton the whole way, we are going to get control, we are going to get control. ---p.47 In addition to the above statement (Hicks is "they") DCM Hicks is blamed here: General Roberson: Sir, for us the chief of mission is the senior American authority in the country…What should have happened, if that all played out the way I saw it on TV, then Mr. Hicks should have picked up the phone and called Carter Ham and said, “I want – I got to talk to you. This team needs to get on this plane. I need them there.” That was the agreed upon process.---p.39 Mr. Chaffetz: So was there ever a request from the Department of State for the Department of Defense for military support in what was happening during the attack.---p.40 ----- General Ham: I am not aware of a request from State to Defense. But I would say, sir, that this was – as this situation was unfolding, our primary link from the Africa Command Command Center was through the defense attaché Mr. Chaffetz: Was there any expectation that there were other military assets coming to help you in Libya?---p.100 ----- LtCol Gibson: There were indications that there were other assets that were in movement. ----- Mr. Chaffetz: Did you make any requests for additional help? ----- LtCol Gibson: Sir, that – the requests had already been made. I was not given a timeline. ----- Mr. Chaffetz: Who made that? Who made the requests? ----- LtCol Gibson: It was my understanding that those requests had gone through DCM Hicks, and also through the Defense Attache. Mr. Reid: But for those reasons, and again, the back channeled calms all night with the State Department, even Mr. Hicks, the Libyans said we are going to get in control.---p. 63 Mr. Thornberry: But I want to get to this point about the arrangements on the ground for logistical support, ground transportation, and so forth. Is that also subject to the chief-of-mission’s authority and subject to their arrangements?---p.141 And finally, the ambassador himself is blamed here: General Roberson: ...but you know, State Department has primary responsibility for security for State Department issues. DoD does not.---p.46 ----- Mr. Turner: Wait a minute. It was a war zone. I mean this is not like, what is happening in Austria or some other place. This is like, you know, you went in and took out Qadhafi. This is a war zone. I mean this is months after a war zone. It just seems as if there would have been greater assets that would have been – tasked with post-war zone. ----- Mr. Reid: Although one month before this attack the last element of DoD that was there for the specific purpose of providing security was dismissed by the ambassador, against the recommendation of the combatant commander. Mr. Chaffetz: You said Ambassador Stevens declined more Department of Defense assets.---p.40 ----Mr. Reid: He declined continuing SST is what I said. ----General Roberson: Yeah. ----Mr. Reid: General Ham offered to sustain the SST, and the ambassador said, I don’t need the SST anymore. Chairman McKeon: It seems to me there was a State Department failure when they released those troops 30 days before…---p.49 Ms. Tsongas: I actually would like to sort of follow up on that issue because I think it is something that’s become ever more clear as we have had these hearings, and that is just how much the Department of State and the ambassador who tragically lost his life, how much they really are in the driver’s seat.---p.11 Ms. Tsongas: Number two is I think over in the many hearings that we have had we have learned over and over again that the State Department was in the driver’s seat. General Ham testified that he had conversations with the Ambassador, wondering if the Site Security Team shouldn’t be extended given the multiple events that were unfolding in Libya. But our Ambassador, tragically for the consequences to him, did not accept the offer of additional help.---p.45
House Benghazi reports lay blame on the State Department. And to those of you who are not into selective reading, they lay some on the ambassador, on the intelligence reports, and a host of others.
They blame the Libyan security. Ms. Tsongas blames the Intelligence community once on page 6 in the first report. Who else is blamed? Can you show me? I admit, I haven't gotten through all the reports, only these 6 from the Armed Services Committee. Show me an example of them blaming someone else besides State Dept (of which can be inferred DCM Hicks and Ambassador Stevens).
