Missiles shields the truth?

They are designed to shoot down enemy nuclear missiles.

Now here are my questions:

What happens when shoot down a nuclear missile. Does it detonate? Are they designed to detonate at impact?
(If they are not, it seems a incredible waste of money by everyone with such a obvious design flaw)

Missile shield locations. Conventional war.

How long would they survive for?, before destroyed by enemy fighter, bomber aircraft or even nukes.

https://www.extremetech.com/extreme...k-which-is-why-were-spending-more-money-on-it

After a quick search i found this, Any other info out there?

 

I'm trying to understand your questions. First you want to know if the nuclear missile detonates when it's hit by defense systems? Depends how it's wired. In the second part, are you asking how to destroy missile shields?

 

Hello ArmySoldier

"First you want to know if the nuclear missile detonates when it's hit by defense systems?" Yes.

"In the second part, are you asking how to destroy missile shields?" Yes

I learned of the Russian Rs-28 Satan 2 class of nuclear missles https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RS-28_Sarmat

"10 heavy warheads or 15 lighter ones or up to 24 hypersonic glide vehicles Yu-71 or a combination of warheads and massive amounts of countermeasures designed to defeat anti-missile systems"

 

No. Current systems are highly unlikely to detonate. The warhead will be smashed before the internal fuses will be able to react. After the warhead will be smashed, it is likely to burn out in the re-entry phase, with almost zero probability of detonation (yep, spreading the reactive material).
At such speeds the metal behaves like a liquid, the warhead will not crash into an intercept vehicle, think like two bodies will splash at each other.

But countermeasures are extremely effective at the moment, they are very cheap, and there are no reliable methods of separating the warhead form a decoy till re-entry phase. Anyway, if the enemy detonates a warhead above intercept area, all below radar systems will go blind.
A valid intercept system was build in cold war times (1972 agreement), when US and USSR agreed to keep 100 intercept missiles (Spartan and Sprint (US)). The intercept was achieved not by a direct hit, but by a nuke blast on the path of enemy warhead. You should think this was a reliable kill, but again, nobody knows how the systems would play in actual combat. A well prepared training intercept and actual combat intercept are two very different issues.

At the moment, the missile intercept system is a sociological tool, not a defensive tool. But things might and likely to change with further development. The antimissile defensive systems are nowhere near their technological ceiling, there is a vast area for improvement.

This depends on how the intercept missile development will continue and what deployment strategy will be chosen. Again, what you see now is from one side waste of money, from the other side – necessary technological learning steps that has to be taken to go up.

But please do note, all above is speculation, nobody on this forum knows the true capabilities of Russian and US antimissile systems, they are classified

 

Tough questions. I think this goes above my area of expertise.

Adding [MENTION=870]Questerr[/MENTION]

 

The article makes false assumptions. The goal of a missile shield is not to be able to stop thousands of Russian missiles. It is to stop a missile from a rouge country such as N. Korea.

The original missile defense shield notion was valid. Set off a huge nuclear explosion in space to take out the incoming missile. Even an upper atmosphere denotation of an incoming nuclear war is far superior to it fully reaching its target.
A non-nuclear approach explored was to denotation essentially a huge collection of basically ballbearings in the missile's path. The extreme speed of the incoming missile traveling thru this barrier would tear up the missile.

The plan back with Reagan was to make that defensive system which has no potential to attack another country space-based, basically satellites. Lack of air resistance would allow such satellite based defensive missiles to accelerate at and extreme rate.

Other methods also are being explored such as lasers, charged photons and mega levels of EMPs.

It is a simple question. You are president. You are told an incoming missile has been detected. Do you have ANY even hope to stop or destroy it - or not. It isn't about stopping a thousand missiles. It is about destroying one or a few.

N. Korean or Iran etc may obtain a few intercontinental missiles, but not thousands like Russia. There also is a potential that we would already be on a high alert, watching status in such event. A major challenge of missile defense is it requires very short reaction times.

It also is not about protecting the entire USA, but major cities, starting with DC of course with NYC second, as those would be the primary targets of a single missile. A defense protecting our top 20 cities and military locations would make for a massive deterrence.

The greatest flaw of the article is assuming that the military is going to publicize its technology and capabilities. No, you can not just phone the military saying "tell me about our anti-missile defenses" and get a response "sure, I'll send you everything we have on that."

 

Missile defense is not about potential mass attack by Russia. Both the USA and Russia have such massive arsenals that we both understand the destructive power so even a 90% effective system would not be sufficient. It is about lesser rouge countries and organizations.

Some missile defense systems also can double an aircraft defense given the extreme speed of a missile compared to intercept aircraft, plus lasers and other defensive systems might be employable. Think of 9-11 and it is learned a jetliner is only minutes away and is for an attack (either to crash into something or carrying a nuke or other WMD). Intercept aircraft likely could not take off and intercept in time. But a missile could as could a laser system.

Again, it is known the likely targets will always be DC and NYC on the East Coast, LA on the West Coast, with Miami and Houston in the South. Defensive systems don't have to cover everywhere. Only key locations.

 

Hello everyone

http://pravda-team.ru/eng/image/article/3/2/8/58328.jpeg I saw this image of the Russian new nukes. And I wondered why build something that big spend tens of billions to have it shot down by a american missile costing a fraction of the cost.

Makes no logical sense to me. And I think Kash is near the truth.

"But please do note, all above is speculation, nobody on this forum knows the true capabilities of Russian and US antimissile systems, they are classified"

 

I will try to answer this as best I can.

First of all, when a missile is intercepted, it does not explode. The purpose of an anti-missile system is to do as much damage to the body of the missile itself (the parts that make it fly), as well as the components that will enable it to detonate. In effect, it is either like hitting it with a large load of buckshot (older systems) or a metal rod (newer systems) so that it falls back to the ground in a relatively safe area.



Now the above photo is of an Iraqi SCUD hit by a first generation PATRIOT missile in 1990. That era of PATRIOT was designed to attack aircraft, so used a proximity fuse to pepper the aircraft with shrapnel. The effect was similar on a SCUD, that is what all those round dots are, impacts from the intercept.

And as can be seen, the missile did indeed fall to the ground and did not explode. Some of them did explode on impact, but they were intercepted in the middle of the desert, where nothing was damaged.

Now a "missile shield" is impossible. Unless a nation is either very small, or is willing to place such an anti-missile site roughly every 200 square miles, you will never get more than a small fraction of them. But you can place them around key locations to prevent (or reduce) the chance that they are hit.

Actually, with the exception of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system and the Navy's SM-3, all missile defense systems operate also as air defense systems. For one, that is because they are all developed out of conventional air-defense systems. Even the SM-3 is simply an advancement of the SM-2.

And theoretically the GMD and SM-3 can intercept aircraft also, but that is a waste of their capabilities. Kind of like using a 40mmm grenade launcher to kill a mouse.

And also you have to consider the type of missile used. If it is a Ballistic Missile, the main defense is another missile system. But if it is a cruise missile, the best defense then is generally having a jet fighter intercept it and shoot it down. A cruise missile really is nothing but a drone that flies unmanned along a preselected course. And we have been shooting those down for over 70 years.

 

One nitpick:

Nuclear warhead based missile defense wasn't really designed for the explosion to destroy incoming warheads, especially outside of the atmosphere because the explosion radius is really small.

Instead, they used Enhanced Radiation Warheads (the so-called "Neutron Bombs") to generate a large pulse of radiation resulting in the neutron flux killing the electronics in the incoming warheads' fusing mechanisms.

 

Sorry, not sure where you got that information, but it was completely wrong.

The only 2 Air Defense systems that used nuclear warheads are the Nike-Zeus and Nike-Hercules systems. These were both designed in the 1950's, originally with the intent of destroying incoming fleets of bombers. The idea was expanded to include missiles, but at a time when the Soviets only had a few score missiles to launch at the US.

But they were happily given up in the ABM Treaty, because the DoD realized that they were pretty ineffective.

And they did not use "neutron bombs" in their warheads. In fact, the Neutron Bomb was not even conceived until after the Hercules was in service.

We did design 1 ABM system that would use the neutron bomb as it's warhead, the Sprint (part of the Nike-X system). But this system was in operation for less than 1 year, the first unit being activated then the entire program being shutdown in 1972 (killed by Congressional disapproval, the advent of MIRV warheads, and the ABM treaty).

Depending on where you live, you can visit one of the 2 Nike missile sites left in place as a museum (SF-88 outside of San Francisco, and NY-56 at Sandy Hook, New Jersey). There is also a large display of them and information about the system at the Air Defense Museum at Fort Bliss, Texas as well as the museum at White Sands, New Mexico.

 

Sprint and Sentinel are the two systems I'm talking about. The Nike missiles by everything I've ever read lacked the capabilities reliably intercept warheads.

Also, you are forgetting about the Soviet Galosh and Gazelle missiles which purportedly use enhanced radiation warheads.

 

Nike was never developed to intercept missiles, it actually predates ICBMs. It was simply adapted in the hopes that it could (not unlike first generation PATRIOT).

I do not really consider the Russian (not Soviet, the Gazelle is post-Soviet breakup) systems, since they only protect a single city, Moscow.

While the ABM treaty did allow for such a system to protect the capitols, the US decided to just forget about a large fixed ABM system at all. Only the Soviets-Russians kept at it. But only protecting a single city is a very big deal.

 

From a strategic standpoint, it's not a bad idea considering it forces your opponents to dedicate a large amount of warheads to taking out that one target.

 

Not really.

You have to realize, nuclear weapons are political terror weapons, not military weapons. We can nuke Russia off of the map into the stone age without sending a single missile at Moscow. And they can do the same thing to us without launching a single missile at DC.

In the modern era, any nation trying to defend itself from missiles from either Russia or the US is foolish. Unless they are a very tiny country with little area to defend (Qatar for example), or are trying to protect themselves from a rogue nation with at most a handfull of weapons (North Korea, Iran, Israel, etc).

But defending against the Russians if they decide to go for broke? Like urinating on a forest fire. The same for them if we do the same thing. Even if their system is 95% effective, our attack will still do considerable damage.

 

We can only nuke Russia off the map and vice versa if the command and control links controlling those weapons are in place.

Taking out the enemy's capital, which is usually also their military command center is key to any nuclear strategy. You need to take out enemy command and control as rapidly as possible in order to minimize the possible retaliatory strike.

By having a powerful ABM network around the capital, it makes it that much more impossible for a decapitating first strike to be able to occur.

 

That is where fallbacks and failsafes, as well as a chain of command have been key parts of the nuclear arsenals since the start of the Cold War.

Are you aware that at all times, at least 1 member of the Cabinet is in a safe and secure location at all times?

This person is known as the "Designated Survivor". They are an individual in the direct line of secession, and whenever the President and all heads of government are in the same place (like during a Joint Session of Congress), they are not there. They are in a secure remote location, with the Nuclear Football and all launch codes. That way if something was to happen to the President, they can immediately take over.

The most recent event of this was the President's 28 February Address to Congress. At that time, the Designated Survivor was Secretary David Shulkin, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. At the Inauguration, it was Senator Orin Hatch (President Pro Tem of the Senate - inbound administration) and Jeh Johnson (Secretary of Homeland Security - outbound administration).

The idea of a "decapitating first strike" has been resolved decades ago, it is not an issue. All of our top leaders are never in the same place at the same time. Why do you think in 2001 the Vice President spent so much time in "undisclosed locations"?

 

Those fallbacks and failsafes can also be disrupted by nuclear strikes. They don't have to be disrupted forever, but a delay of only a couple of minutes can mean losing a considerable amount of your warheads to a first strike.

 

US intercept system was designed to protect against a disarming strike. Russian missile needs roughly 40 minutes to reach US. But Russian sub, could achieve the very same strike in 10-20 minutes if it would be able to get close to US shores. This disarming strike could not be made by a large amount of missiles, it would be 20-40-60 missiles or so.

Protection of homeland was achieved not by protection from total launch but by ensuring mutual destruction, by ensuring protection from a disarming strike.

Spartan made 48 training intercepts, 43 of them are considered successful, that’s a 89% advertised rate.

To disarm US retaliation, Russian missile has to hit the US silo. 1 warhead is needed for one silo. This is achievable. Now take into account that US has a 89% chance to intercept incoming missile. This means that Russians need to launch 10-50 warheads at single US silo (depending on calculation method). Now this is impossible.

The concept was dropped with acceptance of new concept of spreading the launch positions into the sea based on a sub.



Russians on the contrary had their Missile Silos spread through a larger territory. A simultaneous disarming strike from a nearby launch positions such as Sub or Turkey, was unlikely. They would have their 40 minutes to react.

So USSR chose to protect the main population center and the body of government. Protection was meant from a disarming strike against command and from a rouge launch by a crazy US submarine captain or misfire.

USSR has two major population centers – Moscow 10mil, Leningrad 6 mil, and all others are below 2 mil (I think). So it was quite obvious what to protect.

 

Actually that concept was already obsolete by the 1980's, that is the 1950's-1960's playbook. By that time it was already assumed that any nuclear war would either start out limited (1 or 2 nukes in a contested area), or an all-out strike.

And the Soviets pretty much played by the same plan. Even more so, since the CEP of their missiles (SS-19) was estimated to be roughly 1/2 mile. The Minuteman series on the other hand had a CEP of around 100 meters. Se we could almost guarantee a hit on one of their silos, but they could not be guaranteed the same in return. Therefore it was even more important that they launch off all of their missiles as quickly as possible in the event of an all-round strike.

Therefore, the first birds in the air at that time would be all of those sitting in silos.

For the US, that would mean all Minutemen missiles would launch as the Bombers started their penetration runs.

After the dust settled, the bombers would then try to locate and pick-off targets missed in the initial exchange.

Naval Nukes (subs, battleships, carriers, etc) would then be used for any follow-up strikes.

That was the timeline I was trained in during the 1980's. And other than we no longer have loaded bombers flying around the North Pole and other areas ready to go in, I do not imagine it has changed very much.

On the ground, they are just to vulnerable. So those are the ones you get off first. Then the ones in mobile launch systems (ships, aircraft) are held back for any other uses.

With an average flight time of 30 minutes for an ICBM, a few minutes will not matter. I am really not sure where you are going with this, since the US will not launch nukes unless another nation has already launched their nukes. At that time NORAD becomes almost autonomous and any subs not already at sea immediately prepare to depart (as well as any bombers prepare to take off).

Since the end of the Cold War, our nuclear forces have stood down greatly. We no longer have bombers operating 24-7 at failsafe points, and no longer have hot crews on board subs at all times either. But unless some nation like Russia or China was going to do a snapcount type of attack (blind launch with no preparation of their own forces), I do not see that happening.

The moment any launch is detected, DEFCON 1 is immediate. At that point all nuclear forces are prepared to launch, and it is strongly believed that at least some forces are at that time given automatic launch clearance.

You seem to be talking about a fantasy setting where we go from DEFCON 4 to DEFCON 1 with no warning. I can not see that ever happening. Even the time we were at our highest DEFCON level ever (October 1962), we stepped from 5 to 2 over a couple of weeks.

 

A low deflection shot with an SLBM has a flight time anywhere between 2 and 10 minutes, so it's pretty obvious a few minutes matter.

 

Agree, in 1976 Safeguard in North Dakota was shut down, so we should review this period only. Afterwards the concepts have changed.

CEP of SS19 is 900m and considered poor as the missile was placed into service too early, before even full trials wear conducted. 900m was achieved when shooting at full range due to unwanted vibrations developed in flight (no idea). The problem was solved in the first step of modernization. The new version is a 350m CEP. But I do not believe that US or USSR would ever reveal true CEPs. SS19 was supposed to have inertial guidance only. There is no way to achieve 900m CEP with inertial guidance on full range at that time. And 100m CEP of Minuteman cannot possibly be true. There is no way a body with no in air controls can achieve such precision in a free fall from low orbit. It sets its course by burning ablative plating, this burn is inheritably uneven. I choose not to believe J

But we are not talking about SS19, we are talking about a disarming strike that was to be made by a sub carried missile. In the era, that should be R29. This is next gen missile, shooting at a third of its radius or something alike.

Disarming strike is not a stand alone strike. It can easily be a part of an all-out assault. The only difference is that disarming missiles will reach the enemy in 10 minutes and are targeting his Silos, and the main strike will reach the enemy in 40minutes, and they are aimed at the cities. The launch itself can be simultaneous.

Though I completely agree that destruction of a missile in the slio was no easy task for both sides.

 

You are thinking the Minuteman I and II. The Minuteman III added a third stage called the "Post-boost stage" to provide final corrections to trajectory prior to terminal entry. This is what reduced the CEP from 200-300 meters to around 100 meters.

And landing an object into a general vicinity from orbit is not all that hard. Both the US and USSR have been doing this for over half a century.

 

You don't target the silos. You target the launch control centers. Far fewer targets and you can dedicate more missile to them. Once you take out the control centers, the silos are just holes in the ground.

 

As has been pointed out the Sprint short range (relatively) ABMs part of the original U.S. ABM system used a 5 megaton enhanced radiation warhead that was designed to stop incoming ICBM warheads with neutron flux.

A little less than a decade later, small (relatively) tactical nuclear warheads (on the order of 5 kilotons) that killed with a massive enhanced radiation burst (neutrons) was called the "neutron bomb"