Boeing 737 Max 8 Ethiopia Airlines Crash

on commercial aircraft, its because the cabin pressure keeps the door sealed at altitude, the bonus is preventing a panicked imbicile from getting it open...

 

Sure ... I can not and will not rule out a pilot error here, but is he the cause?

We have this weird software that controls and monitors the angle of attack of the aircraft ... and relies on just one sensor. That's strange, because usually something has to be always twice to back up and that raises the question of a design flaw. And as this question arises, the question arises, why it went through the approval!

As far as the software itself is concerned, it works so that it automatically lowers the nose when it says the pilot is going up too steep ... keyword Stall.
Apparently, she does that quite violently ... and does she have the right, with a view to the one sensor?
Of course the pilot has to be trained enough for that and also what he has to do if the software (in his opinion) messes up.

So we have a software that can cause problems ... which Boing admitted after the first crash because the software was updated.
The question of guilt is now unclear ... because:

Was the update sufficient and did it fix the bug?
Why is there still no 2nd sensor?
Hate the sensor had a mistake?
Was the update made on Ethiopian Airlines?
Were the pilots well trained, including software and what to do, etc.?

Different questions and different places where there may be a fault and/ or guilt...
Again, the number of hassle-free flying hours compared to the number of accidents says nothing. It's enough if there's a potential problem, no matter how many times it happens.

 

Human error.

Fig 2. Although the construction logs for the airplane sold to Turkish Air indicated that the torque tube service bulletin had been performed, in fact it had not been done. Over time, the torque tube became progressively more and more bent which allowed the baggage handler for flight 981 to mistakenly believe that the door was locked when it wasn’t.

Another case of human error.

On March 3rd, 1974, the baggage loader servicing flight 981 at Orly airport swung the rear cargo door’s handle to the closed position. He later said he had not felt excessive resistance and he thought the door latched securely.

The individual was from Algeria. He could read neither French nor English so he didn’t understand the words on the decals next to the view port. He also had not been taught to look at the lock pin through the viewing port and didn’t know what it was for.

 

I seriously doubt the engineers were thinking a suicidal person would try to open a door while the aircraft was in flight so they designed the door to prevent this from happening.

 

Excellent post Robert. Now the question is did the "extra pilot" notify the safety department immediately after the flight and if they did what did the safety department do to ensure future crews were aware of the problem and how to overide the malfunctioning system?

"That extra pilot, who was seated in the cockpit jumpseat, correctly diagnosed the problem and told the crew how to disable a malfunctioning flight-control system and save the plane, according to two people familiar with Indonesia’s investigation."

 

I believe there are two switches on the panel that when cut to off, stops the system. It takes almost no training to flip two switches. The switches are easy to reach by the pilot and the co pilot. A lot of pilots let the copilot log a lot of time. The pilot always gets his credit as PIC and logs all time.

Same thing with flight instructors. They amass all time flown by the students so long as the instructor is in the airplane.

Since the pilot in the jump seat understood it, this seems a training problem at both Indonesia Lion and Ethiopia in my humble view. I want to see what the experts say happened.

 

Yes, not simply switching off AP as many have stated in this forum is all that is needed to allow the pilot to get back in control of the plane.

 

No, not simply flipping off two switches for the max 8

 

Listen to cockpit sounds pilots hear when things go wrong.

 

What do you mean. They system to operate has to first be turned on. Turn it off and the pilot has total control.

 

I read last week the procedure that pilots must use to be able to get back in control and the steps needed were more than just switching off the AP. Pity that I can't find the link atm but I'll keep trying.

Edit: More info : "However, that anti-stall system — called MCAS for its acronym — only activates if the autopilot is turned off, according to documents Boeing has shared with airlines and the FAA." https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2...ilot-initiated-random-nosedives/#.XJJ-JtjgodU

Hence the AP activation triggers MCAS to malfunction even though MCAS can't activate with AP on

I'll carry on looking for the procedure to use

 

“It has been obvious since the Lion Air crash that a redesign of the 737 MAX 8 has been urgently needed, yet has still not been done, and the announced proposed fixes do not go far enough.”

https://thepointsguy.com/news/captain-sully-sullenberger-on-737-max-crash/

 

https://thepointsguy.com/news/captain-sully-sullenberger-on-737-max-crash/

 

I have tried to correctly inform this forum on the systems. And so far I am correct.

When i used the AP, I had to turn it on.

Most may not know how quickly pilots turn on the AP after take off. The modern Jet is put under the control of AP as soon as the take off is assured.

There is speculation that the aircraft pitched up nose first. This would be immediately noticed by the pilot. He would be hearing alarms He would not doubt the nose is too high.

He also knows why. He knows this is done by the AP. Don't be fooled by the other acronym, the system is designed to flow like syrup and blend as one system. I saw on a video the two switches on the panel to shut down. Then the pilot is flying. So much use is made of the AP that it might be a good time to prevent the use of the AP under say 5,000 ft above ground elevation. If they do this, the plane has 5,000 recovery time vs what these doomed pilots had.

 

Apparently, the Lion Air cockpit voice recorder had the flight crew pouring though the handook to find out why the nose was repeatedly pushed down and what they could do.

 

It's not much of a story without the whoop-whoop and lighting hair on fire. Quick answers, villains--the usual media BS is being served up. Withholding judgment while waiting for someone to get the bottom of the problem won't do! Why let anything spoil a good hanging?

 

Obviously, as another pilot, I do endorse the idea. Though only in small general aviation aircraft, I worked as a test pilot in certification efforts for one company, and eventually for another as a production test pilot, working closely with the FAA.

I harbor no ill will towards Boeing, but I also recognize that the company is run by humans, imperfect all the way. Further, I recognize the role greed plays, and I know that humans frequently cut corners.

You may think the Max fit nicely into the old 737 type certificate, but the record shows different. Corners were cut so that profits might be maximized.

The most sinful part, if I may use that term, is that the company failed to include sufficient (if any) information about the MCAS in the flight manual, and so no specific training was conducted for the pilots. Thus, as shown on NBC last night, a handful of anonymous ASRS reports were sent in by the pilots flying the quirky machine.

If Boeing had called it a new type and gone through a normal and appropriate flight test program, this would not have happened. They did not because they wanted to compete with Airbus.

Aviation Week & Space Technology just today dealt with this. One must be a subscriber to view it, and maybe you are. Check it out.

 

A friend of mine flying an A-6 off the same carrier was the last to see him, checking out the aircraft as they returned to the carrier. Because he was the last to see the Hornet, he was named to the investigation board. Very interesting, what they found.

 

This is super. Two pilots chatting.

I am going to be clear. What you did gives you more expertise on this than I have. Again, you know MORE.

I want to defend Boeing in this respect.

There have been 350 of those airplanes in service. By this time, they have completed well into the tens of thousands of flight hours collectively. We see nothing mentioned, even in the media, that those successful flights get counted. When you tested, since I am asking and you know, in the General aviation aircraft you tested, how much testing? Do you admit to taking shortcuts?

Were you so eager to please those that hired you as to pull dangerous stunts? I mean stunts like just saying, yep, that dangerous airplane is safe to fly?

I want to see plenty of Pilot Reports contained in the onboard book kept on that 757 before jumping Boeing's bones. If they deserve it,. I shall jump pretty hard.

 

Because the certification was the first for the company, the FAA guys were there every single step of the way. We did everything the rules required, and everything the FAA folks said to do. No corners were cut. First time for me, and it was a fantastic learning experience.

Check out the ASRS reports yourself. I have not done so, but they are public record, and NBC and probably others have done so. In fact, a handful of pilots flying the machine commented on the peculiar pitch down performed by the aircraft. It is not imaginary, and there are reasons for it. The largest reason is that no proper flight test program was done to identify the bad habit.

The engines were different, the thrust lines were different, the landing gear was different, the CG limits were different, and the horizontal tail was different. All those things make it a different airplane. If they are going to err, they should err on the side of caution. Clearly they did not. Careless and reckless behavior by the corporation headed up by humans.

 

The AP can be easily switched on/off. If the MCAS is automatically enabled only a circuit breaker can disable it. All electrical systems have circuit breakers. Where the breaker is located for the MCAS is most likely on the flight deck and within easy reach by the pilot who is not flying the aircraft.

 

I think we are talking about a two different incidents

I was referring to the VMFA-232, FA-18C that was returning home (MCAS Miramar) from a tour of duty killing Obama's JV-Team, ISIS in the ME.

Maj. Sareen's FA-18 had a complete electrical failure and the aircraft flipped over and he couldn't do **** not even eject.

 

My USAAF/USAF test pilot father-in-law flew ABOUT 150 aircraft (lots of versions of the same plane) including German and Japanese fighters. I never met a cooler customer. I asked him one time what he did when things went wrong. "I got down to work," he replied.

I met a lot of his Air Force buddies over the years especially at what was at one time the Air Force Village West--a retirement community for old Air Force guys at March Field. They were all cut from thst same cloth. Cool customers. Great guys.

 

Hadn't heard that Trump criticized the 737.

 

How very true.