'AB 103 changed California Penal Code sections 29805 to say that even someone who “has an outstanding warrant for” an alleged violation of other codes and who “owns, purchases, receives, or has in possession or under custody or control, any firearm” is guilty of a crime that is “punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison, by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine.” “AB 103 created a serious new, and potentially felony crime for merely being accused of committing some crime and having a gun,” explained FPC’s California lobbyist and spokesperson, Craig DeLuz. “These are the kind of laws that books about dystopian futures are inspired by.” “I was taught in school that, in America, people are innocent until proven guilty,” DeLuz continued. “Apparently, the California Legislature thinks that all gun owners are guilty of a crime in all cases and must be punished, period. But my copy of the Constitution doesn’t have any ‘gun owner’ exception to fundamental, individual rights like due process and the right to keep and bear arms.” ' Insane,unethical AND unconstitutional in my opinion.Apparently you can be convicted of owning a firearm even if the original charges are dropped.... this is a bad as current asset forfeiture law which has evolved into a criminal enterprise. Source: https://bearingarms.com/tom-k/2017/...-repeal-laws-charge-gun-owners-charged-crime/
you must know that it is a felony to own a gun while you are under indictment. An Indictment is not proof of guilt nor does it obliterate your presumption of innocence. if you are acquitted or the indictment is quashed but you had a gun you can get a felony for such a thing which is incredibly unjust. I understand the reasoning but I would change the law to 0f you are under indictment and obtain a firearm and you are convicted of the offense in the indictment then you can be charged with the 18 USC 922 violation but not until you are convicted
one lawyers thoughts : . The federal gun ban includes some people who are only under indictment! Anyone who is "under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" is not allowed "to ship or transport . . . any firearm or ammunition or receive any such firearm or ammunition." 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). The meaning of this statute is a bit unclear. At the very least, it bars anyone under indictment from "receiving," or acquiring, a gun that they did not own before being indicted. But what about guns that someone owned before they were indicted? Are they required to get rid of them after the indictment is handed down? The express terms of the statute mention only shipping, transporting, and receiving a gun, not possessing one. In comparison, the federal statute that applies the gun ban to convicted felons and to those with misdemeanor domestic violence convictions expressly bans possession, as well as shipping, transporting, and receiving. You can make a strong argument based on the wording of the statute that someone under indictment is allowed to possess a gun he owned before being indicted, even if he is not allowed to ship, transport, or receive it. But when does possession become transporting? And when does it become shipping? In my opinion, the issues are too murky, and the stakes are too high. The safer and better practice is probably to advise all clients under indictment to get rid of their guns and not to have anything to do with any guns while the indictment is pending. http://www.williamslawonline.com/Press-Room/Top-10-Things-Know-About-Federal-Gun-Law.shtml
It needs some wording changes, but all in all, I have no issues with someone under indictment losing some civil rights, one of them being the right to and bear arms.
Interesting. Complicated. If you're under indictment, and possess previously, legally, obtained firearms, you should be able to keep those firearms during the indictment IMO. New purchases, reception, obtainment, while under indictment is another thing. Prosecutor Reads Federal Ban on People Who Are Under Indictment Receiving Guns as Being Satisfied by Possession of Guns by Eugene Volokh on May 11, 2011 2:31 pm in Guns In the post below, I discussed whether it was constitutional to ban gun possession by all people who are under indictment. But in the case in which the U.S. Attorney argued that this was constitutional, no such statute was actually in play. Federal law bars gun possession by felons, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), but only gun receipt, shipment, and transportation by those under indictment for a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). Yet the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Southern District of Alabama indicted Clayton Adams for “knowingly possess[ing]” a gun, “n violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(n),” and argued to the court that “proof of possession would satisfy proof of receipt for the purposes of Section 922(n).” But that can’t be right. As the court pointed out, in its April 18 decision, Though there may be circumstances where evidence of possession is sufficient to prove receipt, the terms “possess” and “receive” are not synonymous…. Discussing the meaning of “receipt” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), a predecessor statute, the Eleventh Circuit held: “’Receipt,’ under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), is interpreted broadly and includes any knowing acceptance or taking of possession of a firearm.” United States v. Griffin, 705 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). As the government points out, a number of circuits have held that proof of possession, either actual or constructive, is sufficient to prove receipt. E.g., United States v. Manni, 810 F.2d 80, 84 (6th Cir. 1086); United States v. Clark, 741 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Martin, 732 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1984); Goerlich, 729 F.2d at 1170; United States v. Lipps, 659 F.2d 960, 961 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Turnmire, 574 F.2d 1156, 1157-58 (4th Cir. 197. Still, those cases do not address the sufficiency of an indictment that fails to track the statutory language and charges a person under indictment with “possessing,” rather than “receiving,” a firearm. The statute criminalizes receipt of a firearm after indictment. Even assuming that one who possesses a firearm necessarily received it first, receipt is a discrete occurrence while possession implies a continuous act. A person who acquires a firearm and is later indicted continues to possessthe firearm, but he does not receive the firearm again by virtue of that possession. A person under indictment who accepts or takes possession of a firearm after the indictment has both possessed and received a firearm. When the indictment charges only possession, either scenario is possible, but only the latter violates the statute. Thus, an indictment that alleges only possession of a firearm by a person under indictment is insufficient to charge a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). I would go further and say that in most cases possession of a gun after an indictment is not, by itself, sufficient evidence to prove — beyond reasonable doubt — receipt after an indictment. Nor is it by itself sufficient, I think, to create probable cause to believe that the gun was received after the indictment (probable cause is the standard required for a grand jury to indict). But in any event, to indict a grand jury must actually find (in a nonadversarial hearing, and after hearing only the prosecutor’s side of the evidence) that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed — here, that the defendant actually received the gun after being indicted. The indictment in this case did not reflect that. I think § 922(n) is an unconstitutional restriction on Second Amendment rights, since the right to possess a gun must include the right to acquire the gun, free of government prohibition, and since — as I argued in the earlier post — Second Amendment rights aren’t lost just because one has been indicted. But, independently of that, § 922(n) just doesn’t sweep nearly as broadly as the prosecutor argued. (Note: The federal bans on gun possession and gun receipt are technically limited to “possess[ion] in or affecting commerce” or receipt of “any firearm … which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce”; but in practice these jurisdictional requirements have been read in such a way that they are almost always satisfied.) http://volokh.com/2011/05/11/prosec...uns-as-being-satisfied-by-possession-of-guns/
