All aircraft use a stabilizer trim wheel for all fight control surfaces. Pilots can trim the plane manually without disengaging the AP. Boeing issued a bulletin stating MCAS is disengaged when the AP is engaged. Maybe the Ethiopian pilots engaged the AP which corrected the problem and then for some reason disengaged the AP which resulted in the malfunctioning MCAS to drive the nose pitch down again?
Maybe MCAS never failed during the certification process? Maybe you can put a little more thought into your assumptions?
No, with the AP engaged the pilot cannot trim the plane manually. He can with AP off, but when it's on the AP does the trimming.
There was no certification process--that's the point. Boeing cheated and thereby avoided a full certification process, including a full flight test regimen. They "paper whipped" the certification process to save $ and get the plane to market sooner.
The autopilot is probably dumb as a brick, and without the books for that plane, so are we, but we get bits from online that may or may not be specific to that plane; MCAS is off when AP is on, you can't fight the AP, the electric trim on the yoke is a losing situation against MCAS, and if AP turned on and you fight it the AP trims you to death straight into the ground? Any jury is going to be in for a ride, at least until their brains fry.
Yep, everything could have worked fine, but it doesn't mean it was a good design. A good design lasts so long a museum wants one, they wanted one from our squadron. Then some idiot exceeds specs, twice they turn down your QAD, that takes more than one idiot, and then the suits, six, I'm talking President of company looking at clusterfracking of an entire line of aircraft, just because some (lots) couldn't fracking read specs which were older than they were.
More reporting of the terrifying speed upon impact: "6 Minutes of Terror: What Passengers and Crew Experienced Aboard Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302" http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019...rienced-on-the-ethiopian-airlines-flight.html 8:43:45 a.m.: Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 impacts a farm field at nearly 700 miles per hour, killing everyone aboard instantly and creating a crater 90 feet wide and 120 feet long. Wreckage is driven into the soil up to 30 feet deep.
Basically, the plane is obeying broken instead of brains: "They also use a switch on their yokes to trim the stabilizer back up. By doing this they manage to stop the nose from dropping further, but the plane is still losing altitude. Then the MCAS kicks in again, moving the stabilizer so that it drops the nose even further. Now things are looking really dangerous."
Well, at least it was fast and instant. Can you imagine having all of your bones broken and then you burn in the burning leftovers of the plane while sitting in your seat unable to get out?
I think Boeing should just place the damn turn off button on the pilots dashboard. It’s retarded that you can’t just turn it off!
You don't understand or fly airplanes. I do. You have not been involved in aircraft certification. I have.
When you operate cheap airlines cutting corners to save money becomes a safety issue. Apparently both Lion and the latest Ethiopian airline chose not to include an AoA discrepancy warning light. How much did it really save the airlines by not including this option? P.S. The 737 Max had two AoA sensors and not just one that is being reported. I don't know of any aircraft that doesn't have one on the left and the right side near the nose of the aircraft. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...-engineers-before-crash-experts-idUSKCN1NZ0QL
What good is an ON/OFF switch if pilots aren't probably trained in such emergencies? A bulletin came out from Boeing after the Lion crash explaining the procedure to disable MCAS. If airlines don't bother keeping up with safety bulletins and provide training who is really to blame?
Yeah, I just copied each point from pilot websites, that's why I put a question mark at the end. I only said what they were saying, and some where not in agreement, that means any jury will be confused. Congress will have to investigate your charges about cheating..., I'm not disagreeing, just questioning.
The fact there is different reporting is troublesome. Like some pilots were saying that the trim on yoke could not keep up with what MCAS was doing, so you keep going down just slower, and some saying different. Some things should probably be standard, I have no idea how much it cost. The Ethiopian ones called out the Stab Trim cutout according to the above post link by Thedimon but by then it seems too late, too fast...
That would be pitot tubes, but that is different, for the life of me couldn't remember anything about angle of attack, because old pitot tubes don't do that. Apparently there is a company that makes one that does.
AOA equipment has traditionally been in use only in jet aircraft, though in the last 10 years or so systems have been developed after-market for general aviation piston aircraft. There are a variety of sensors that can be mounted on the nose where the airflow is undisturbed.
Where are you getting your information regarding the Ethiopian pilots placing the Trim switch in the cutout position? The voice recorder communication has not been released yet as far as I know.
It like most stuff just tells you something. When stuff starts taking over, it better work, Boeing can't blame the pilot for his mistakes when it is their **** that doesn't work.
Some folks think more bells and whistles would prevent things like this from happening but that has been proven wrong. Experience and redundant training is the most effective way to prevents accidents.
It was in that post by Carlosofcali: http://www.politicalforum.com/index...airlines-crash.552408/page-19#post-1070437239 http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019...rienced-on-the-ethiopian-airlines-flight.html
There are pitot tubes on both side as well. There are also two air pressure ports on both sides of an aircraft. Two wind vane type sensors are located on both sides which are the AoAs. Aircraft position relevant to airflow over the aircraft makes it necessary to use two of each types of sensors.