Boeing 737 Max 8 Ethiopia Airlines Crash

The incident in Ethiopia was a 45 degree decent at well over 600 miles an hour. Will Boeing survive all the lawsuits?

 

600 mph is pretty much full cruising speed of the airliner. I doubt it achieved such speed.

 

Gutsy call to keep building them even as people begin to cancel some orders.

 

Not over 600 mph but close:

"Foreman: Early report shows plane dove at nearly 600 mph" https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/20...-crash-preliminary-report-foreman-bts-vpx.cnn

 

Part of the thing is though, one plane survived because they had in essence a flight engineer (another pilot), who was familiar with it; maybe in situations where the electronics is in question, why older planes had flight engineers, they probably need one to turn the trim wheels and other stuff.

 

Maybe pilots should just RTFB? After the Lion crash Boeing provided information on how to disengage MCAS. Whether or not the Ethiopian crew was aware of that bulletin remains to be seen.

 

I'm sure that is airspeed and not ground speed. Boeing sent out a bulletin after the Lion crash explaining how to disable the MCAS in the event the 737 Max experiences an uncontrolled nose down attitude. The voice recorder along with the flight data recorder will tell whether or not the procedures were followed.

 

Did they even know of the previous incident on the same plane? Different crew, same problem, same plane, did the ground try to fix it? Funniest that ever happened to me, "radar will not sweep," opened the radome and the antenna fell out. Yeah pilots read the stuff, but is that enough, if you read it, and don't like the "fix, down it. How many refused to fly it? If you put a flight engineer in there, for that reason, they damn sure will know it, why not a bulletin for that?

The past has happened. Even making the pilot and copilot sign off on it, this is a problem, the plane is broken, and it was broken, may not be enough.

 

but Boeing were making money by selling sh//t, we have to happy for them.

 

MCAS is controlled by two switches on the upper back side of the center console. The ET302 crew had turned off MCAS, gained control, re-engaged MCAS, and then crashed. The cause of the crash is being attributed to "blowback." Had they left MCAS off, and reduced airspeed they would not have likely crashed.

* Blowback - High airspeed at low altitude causing air pressures on control surfaces above design resulting in the flight crew being unable to use the electric / hydraulics to trim the aircraft.

 

I hope not. This was a classic example of profit being put before safety when you get into the devil that is in the details.

 

When you say MCAS is controlled by two switches do you mean two ON/OFF switches?

 

Maybe "Stab Trim" cutout on the pedestal behind trim wheels on right side? I think a picture pops up Googling it.

 

http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm

 

The link I posted of Boeing's procedures to over ride MCAS does not mention an ON/OFF switch. It does say MCAS is activated when the AP is off. It also mentions the manual horizontal stabilizer trim tab wheel over rides MCAS. Trying to level the aircraft with the yoke will not disable MCAS and will only provide a momentary nose pitch correction before MCAS resumes control.

 

Great picture! Thanks.

 

As I understand it, MCAS when operating drives the stabilizer trim. Therefore, turning the stabilizer trim OFF effectively disables any MCAS input.

 

The response I saw too mentioned the trim but not the switches, I quoted an FAA one that mentioned the switches:
http://www.politicalforum.com/index...airlines-crash.552408/page-17#post-1070422782

Pilots don't have the luxury of searching the Internet. Big red notice when they check in, plane is broken, may nose dive, do this if it does...

A pilot might have a huge chunk of time figuring out it isn't something else.

 

Then they have to undo what it did, I don't think it would go to a neutral or something, like pull back on them wheels while not freaking out.

 

Both the Lion Air and Ethiopia aircraft were found with stabilizer trimmed to full travel, nose down.

Had Boeing been honest and professional in certifying this aircraft, such things would have been discovered in the certification process.

 

Definitely a broken plane. The motor apparently will do its thing if not overriding or the switches are off.

One angle of attack sensor?

Larry Sensor says we angled up, Curly Sensor says we angled down, Moe Sensor pokes Larry in the eye and says down. That's what Boolean is for.

Does not look good for Boeing.

 

One AoA sensor was standard equipment. Two AoA sensors is an $86k-ish option that Boeing has since made standard equipment going forward.

 

Trim on the 737NG & Max is controlled primarily by flippers on the yoke. It's not only MCAS and / or manual trim wheel. MCAS is intended only to auto trim the aircraft as it reaches its flight envelope edge of AoA nose-up / stall. That condition is unique to the Max and not the previous generations of 737 as engine placement, weight balance, and thrust can cause a runaway nose-up stall on climb-out after flaps and leading edges are retracted.

 

Turns off if they disagree, got it. Optional safety stuff, that would be like parachutes...

People tie their little fingers to death to keep plastic off those control cables, but FOD flies too, so you got trim if something jams, then some one lobe engineer designs stupid trim.

 

Airlines always have the last say on whether or not an aircraft is arirworthy. Boeing issued a bulletin regarding MCAS and problems pilots might experience and how to over ride the system. The bulletin which I posted came out 1 week after the Lion crash.