Oh goody. The seven hundred pilots are suing over the fact that they warned Boeing about the problems that eventually brought down two 737 Max planes; but Boeing did not listen and forced them to continue to fly the planes even though they had been told of the problems. I don't about Boeing's future, but it just got an order from India worth $290 billion in over the next 20 years.
You don't understand the full meaning of aerodynamic stability. I'm guessing you're not a pilot. As for TWA800, the fuel tank think was a cover-up. That's not what really happened. What really happened was an errant missile from the US Navy took down the flight. Jack Cashill has studied it most. https://www.americanthinker.com/art...a_800em_time_to_reopen_the_investigation.html
Never flew. Worked on A6A’s in the Marines. Though not an aeronautic engineer, understand the basics of flight. I think perhaps you’re defining “stability” narrower than I.
Yes, likely I am. I worked in aircraft production for a number of years, so I'm defining it in accordance with terms used in the business. Aircraft that meet the terms can be certified by the FAA. Those that do not meet those standards are not certified. The MAX certification was snuck in through the back door. That aircraft required an augmentation system to make it appear stable on paper. The system did not work as they thought it would.
From the OP's link. "Boeing said the company did not rely on engineers from HCL and Cyient for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which has been linked to the Lion Air crash last October and the Ethiopian Airlines disaster in March. The Chicago-based planemaker also said it didn’t rely on either firm for another software issue disclosed after the crashes: a cockpit warning light that wasn’t working for most buyers."
The 737 Max like all aircraft has two stall indicator sensors which are used by other systems. When the MCAS was installed on the 737 Max only one sensor was connected to the MCAS computer which is where the designers screwed up. I would certainly like to know why the engineers chose not to connect both. Airplanes are known to be very safe due to redundant systems.
But, if we think about it a little more, it is unlikely the sensor actually failed. There have been way to many reports of the MCAS being engaged. That kind of leaves us with 2 possibilities. 1- it was an actual warning. Which could be true since both were close to take off. 2- The sensors are inherently glitchy and the code should cover that. Also possible.
MCAS is always active even when the AP is engaged. Which is why deactivating the AP does not deactivate MCAS.
Airlines cannot force pilots to fly an unsafe aircraft. Unions would certainly not allow it to happen. Boeing is not an airline and has no control over airline pilots. Do you have a link proving 700 pilots complained directly to Boeing about the problem?
What we are talking about is the AOA or Angle of Attack which are located on both sides of the aircraft at the nose. AOAs have been used on aircraft long before MCAS was installed on the 737 Max. Apparently the engineers believed only one AOA was needed for MCAS to do the job. Many times at take off, as a C130 loadmaster I knew the CG was aft and advised the pilots to expect a nose pitch up at take-off. The pilots manually controlled the pitch using the yoke until the reached a cruising altitude and then set the elevator trim tabs before engaging the AP. Why the need for MCAS I have no idea? An angle of attack indicator offers a visual indication of the amount of lift the wing is generating at a given airspeed or angle of bank. The AOA delivers critical information visually or through an aural tone to indicate the actual safety margin above an aerodynamic stall.
Near as I can tell they were trying to make it feel like the old models. Something about certification?
The opinion of pilots probably matter. But the opinion of what type of aircraft flies matters more to the US government. They don't like it when things crash and they know because those planes are just unsafe. And that goes probably for most of the world who gives a damn.
Engineers seem to over think things. More automation, bells and whistles only confuse pilots. I do believe there is a push to make planes autonomous an MCAS might be the next step towards new generation aircraft that can fly without pilots.
That solution created an aerodynamics problem. Due to their size and position, the engines on the Max create lift when the airplane enters a steep climb (or, in aviation parlance, at high angles of attack). This extra lift causes the Max to handle differently than previous versions of the 737, but only when it’s climbing steeply. That solution created a regulatory problem. In order for different airplane models to share a type certificate, the FAA requires that they all handle the same way. A model of airplane with sensitive controls, like a sports car, can’t share a type certificate with a model whose controls are much more sluggish, like a semi truck. Boeing was concerned that the FAA might consider this enough to give the Max its own type rating, undermining one of its promised selling points.
I provided this link confirming your assessment of the 737 Max. I was under the mistaken belief the engines were placed further aft of the nose causing the nose to pitch up. "the Journal reported that Boeing engineers found that under certain conditions the 737 MAX's engines -- which are larger and located higher and closer to the front -- boost the chances that the aircraft would tilt upward too steeply -- causing the plane to stall." https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterc...sed-by-737-max-engine-placement/#7527fb4e40aa