Hiroshima: the Crime that keeps on paying

Easy to write, where is your proof?

 

Look how eager they were to pursue Soviet mediation:
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/#_tc4

Look at the fact that they refused to try any other avenue of escaping the war until after the Soviets declared war on them (at which point they instantly switched to trying to escape the war some other way).

http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/defense_spending

"The reports' conclusions were generally favourable about the contributions of Allied strategic bombing towards victory, calling it 'decisive'."

"The major conclusion of the report was that strategic bombing, particularly the destruction of the oil industry and truck manufacturing had greatly contributed to the success of the Allies in World War II."

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Strategic_Bombing_Survey

"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons..."

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_D._Leahy

Look at all the historians who have made valid post-war conclusions about the surrender of Japan.

The existence of valid post-war conclusions should count as evidence that a post-war conclusion can be valid.

The absence of any such system of morality in recorded human history should suffice as evidence of their non-existence.

 

If they chose to disbelieve their own report, that was folly on their part. Their eyewitness report clearly corroborated Truman's claim.

In that case why worry about whether there was enough time for surrender between the A-bombs?

True, but it is the point when Japan stopped trying to win the war and started trying to escape the war.

 

There was no eye witness report at the time the decision was made to not surrender, with all communications capability and infrastructure destroyed in the Hiroshima area, reports with exact details flowed in extremely slowly delaying any kind of decision process. The Japanese government, completely in a state of shock, did not communicate with the Allies. Truman initially ordered a halt of bombings on Japan, but as he received no words from Tokyo, he took the lack of response as a sign of Japanese arrogance and a sign of the refusal to surrender. "If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the likes of which has never been seen on this earth", he said. He later gave the go-ahead to drop the second atomic weapon on Japan.

You are kidding are you not .. does the unnecessary death of ~39,000 and the ~25,000 injured mean nothing to you?

Agreed. Personally I don't think the US would have accepted any peace deal . .they had a new toy and were going to use it.

 

Lesse:

- If the Japanese were "defeated" and 'ready to surrender" on August 5th, they were brought to this condition entirely by allied efforts in the PTO and CBI; the retention or loss of Manchuria has no effect on this condition.
Proof:
As of August 5th 1945, Japan had only fought the allies in the PTO/CBI theaters; the Russians had not yet invaded. Therefore, only the allies and their actions in the PTO/CBI could have driven the Japanese to their "defeated" and "ready to surrender" state.

- Little to none of the post-Nagasaki conversation within the highest levels of Japanese government regarding surrender involved the Russian invasion; virtually without exception it revolved around the threat of the bomb and their inability to defend against it
Proof:
The absence of discussion among the Japanese regarding the Russians.

There you go.

 

Lots of writing, no links to verify .. please provide the links to the "proof"

 

Thank you for proving that I need no longer waste any time on you.

 

Thank you for proving that you spout things without having anything to back them up and as such are willing to reside in ignorance.

 

They received an eyewitness report on the morning of August 7.

The timeline shows that both of the times that Japan decided on a surrender offer in the evening, they were able to communicate that to us by the very next morning.

No go-ahead was required for the second A-bomb on August 9. The orders were to drop the bombs as they became ready and weather permitted.

The order to halt A-bombing came after Japan's initial surrender offer on August 10. Truman wanted to give Japan some breathing room once they finally started talking about surrender, even though their initial offer wasn't good enough for us to accept.

Define unnecessary. The entire war was unnecessary. Japan could have left us alone from the start.

Hiroshima could be viewed as just as unnecessary as Nagasaki in that Japan was already trying to escape the war and only needed to realize that their attempts to get the Soviets to help them were futile.

I don't see what the question of "necessity" has to do with the timing between the A-bombs. During the war when the bombs were being dropped, we didn't know what it would take to make Japan surrender. All we knew was that they hadn't surrendered yet. And if Japan was under the illusion that we didn't have more A-bombs, the only thing that would have disabused them of that illusion would be to drop more A-bombs on them.

The peace deal that Japan hoped to secure through the Soviets included: no occupation of Japan, Japanese troops just packing up and returning home without being disarmed, and Japan being in charge of Japanese war criminals. We certainly wouldn't have accepted that.

We would have accepted a surrender based on the Potsdam Proclamation however.

 

Please provide proof that Bombing Survey conclusions are highly flawed. Conclusions are based on damage assessment and statistics I would love to see where they made a mistake.

I have read the Sato-Togo communication on the matter. I see Japanese officials searching for USSR mediation. Your interpretation is possible but you need to prove that your interpretation is the only possible, or the most logical out of many. I do not see it to be so. I do not see Togo investing much into this discussion, and Sato does not believe in it at all, he voices his opinion in every other letter.
Please provide proof that Japan would continue to wait for Soviet answer even if USSR would not enter the war.

So far I see a report that complies with reality with few exceptions that I am aware of. This report depicts both the successes and failures of USAF. Role of USAF was decisive in inflicting damage in many areas. If you are stating that report is untrue, or it is faked, please provide proof.

Sea power was crucial in conquering an island, US stated new standards on the surface of the ocean, every respect to the Navy. Role of A-bombs is not comparable to the role of Navy in the war in any aspect. Please prove your point that Leahy was not stating the obvious but pulling the budget blanket.

I understand correctly that you realize there was a mistake in your logic?

There two basic probabilities:
1. Such a system is non-existent.
2. You are not aware of such a system.
What makes you think that probability 1 is the correct one? Please prove your statement

 

In general …

1.)
The invasion of Iwo Jima and Okinawa cost the US high losses and so they expected much more if invading the main islands and depending to the Japanese plans this fear was well reasoned!
2.)
Replacements from the European Front after German surrender in May were not really possible and given, but still on work. BUT … the necessary forces (means fighting soldiers on land) were not enough in eyes of US staff!
3.)
True is that the Red Army was preparing their attack on Japan by massive troop transports from Europe to Asia. But when they would have been ready for the attack is unclear! No side can proof here their telling of they were ready or not ready! Fact is that these forces which finally attacked short before surrender were a quick formed Force of units which were at this time there and more or less combat ready as it is fact they were lucky to meet in majority 2nd and 3rd class Japanese units.
4.)
Fact is that both – Hiroshima and Nagasaki – were important cities with plants and being military centers. In Nagasaki was for example the main production from Mitsubishi and they produced aside many other things for example what? The Zero fighter plane! In Hiroshima was the HQ of 2nd Army and 5th Division which were responsible to defend South Japan … and in total about 40,000 Soldiers were stationed in Hiroshima!
5.)
Fact is that Nagasaki was only bombed, because the first target on which bomb should be thrown – Kokura was unclear due to bad weather. So only this bad weather made Nagasaki the target and victim at least… normally Kokura had been atomized and this city had also major plants of military industries!
6.)
Fact is that the complete 2nd bomb and the need to throw is really questionable … means was it really necessary to nuke it after Hiroshima? IMO I will say No, because the Japs was no real time given to react after Hiroshima and even if a “proof” was necessary to show that the US can do again and again, there were for sure many alternatives existing. But on the other hand it is true that no side and no single country fighting in WW-2 gave more as a crap on any civilian losses and victims. In other words … if all had the possibilities to throw the bomb, they all would have done it!

 

My "highly flawed" comment refers only to their conclusion about the Soviet entry into the war. The rest of the Strategic Bombing Survey was more budget propaganda than outright error.

Japan felt that Soviet mediation was far superior to any other way of exiting the war. Note:

"On June 22, the Emperor summoned the Big Six to a meeting. Unusually, he spoke first: "I desire that concrete plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts made to implement them."[43] It was agreed to solicit Soviet aid in ending the war. Other neutral nations, such as Switzerland, Sweden, and the Vatican City, were known to be willing to play a role in making peace, but they were so small they were believed unable to do more than deliver the Allies' terms of surrender and Japan's acceptance or rejection. The Japanese hoped that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to act as an agent for Japan in negotiations with America and Britain.[44]"

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan

Given the fact that Japan found Soviet mediation to be far preferable to any other way of escaping the war, and the fact that Japan pursued Soviet mediation to the exclusion of all other options right up until the moment when it finally became completely impossible for them to continue, it stands to reason that as long as they had any hope that they could somehow secure Soviet mediation, they would continue pursuing it.

Japan's preference for Soviet mediation over any other course of action was not going to change. If they had continued hopes that they could still secure Soviet mediation, they were not going to suddenly shift gears and start pursuing what to them would have been a far less appealing option.

Let's go with exaggerated. It was a typical "air power wins wars" argument, used as propaganda to influence post-war budgeting.

Here is a quote from pages 286 and 287 of "Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945" by Leon V. Sigal. (I don't know if there is a difference between hardcover and softcover but I'm quoting from Chapter 6 of the hardcover version.)

"With so much at stake, those claims were not long in coming once the war ended. The chief of naval operations, Admiral King, saw the key to victory in the struggle of navy against navy. In his final report King asserted, "Japan's armies were intact and undefeated and her air forces only weakened when she surrendered, but her navy had been destroyed and her merchant marine had been fatally crippled." Yet for every admiral who agreed with King that "Japan lost the war because she lost command of the sea, and in doing so lost--to us--the islands bases from which her factories and cities could be destroyed by air," there were army airmen prepared to respond, as did Arnold in his final war report, by relegating the other services to distinctly subservient roles: "Fully recognizing the indispensable contributions of other arms, I feel that air power's part may fairly be callled decisive."1 Others were prepared to put the air force case more forcefully. "The Navy," testified General James H. Doolittle, "had the transport to make the invasion of Japan possible; the Ground Forces had the power to make it successful; and the B-29 made it unnecessary."2 Against this combined onslaught, the most the army could muster was to highlight its role in Europe while fighting a rearguard action about the part it had played in victory over Japan. The army recalled its campaign of island-hopping across the Pacific that brought it to the verge of invading Japan proper and dwelt on the potency of the threat that its invasion posed. After all, there is nothing as potent as an unexecuted threat--or as successful as an untried strategy.

Yet there was unanimity among the armed services on one key point: the atomic bomb had not been necessary for victory. Even to Arnold, conventional bombing had won the war: "Without attempting to minimize the appalling and far-reaching results of the atomic bomb, we have good reason to believe that its actual use provided a way out for the Japanese government. The fact is that the Japanese could not have held out long, because they had lost control of the air." Atomic bombing could hardly justify the planes and pilots for a seventy-group air force on bases circling the globe that the army airmen were seeking at war's end, but Arnold could put it to good use against the navy by claiming that "the only known effective means of delivering atomic bombs in their present stage of development is the very heavy bomber," one presumably too heavy to take off from the deck of an aircraft carrier. This allowed Arnold to conclude, "The influence of atomic energy on Air Power can be stated very simply. It has made Air Power all-important."3 In the face of repeated service efforts to downplay the bomb's role in the victory over Japan and to question the need for its use, Groves and others in charge of the Manhattan Project propagated a novel doctrine to justify the atomic bombings. That doctrine stressed the bomb's shock effect on Japan's body politic."


Here is a quote from pages 355 and 356 of "Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire" by Richard B. Frank. (Hardcover again, if the softcover has different page numbers.)

"Moreover, these affirmations of the effectiveness of sea- and airpower appeared in the midst of conflicts over service roles and budgets, particularly those connected to the creation of a single Department of Defense with a separate Air Force. While naval leaders such as Leahy may have experienced moral revulsion over atomic weapons, their arguments arose while counteracting the thrust for ascendancy of air leaders. The airmen, not surprisingly, wished to burnish the image of the decisive nature of air warfare and thus had an institutional interest in proclaiming the effectiveness of conventional, as well as atomic, attack. Accordingly, these statements packed a lot of baggage behind their superficial representations of sound military judgment."

There was no mistake in my logic. It is possible for a post-war analyst to reach an accurate conclusion long after the war has ended.

If such a weird system of morality existed, it would be famous for its weirdness and everyone would know of it.

The very fact that it is completely unreasonable to expect people to act on knowledge that can only be acquired in the future means that any system of morality that expected such a thing would be unreasonable.

An unreasonable system of morality is, by definition, not a reasonable system of morality.

 

Japan had three days to react. How is this not enough time to react?

What does necessary have to do with anything? They hadn't surrendered so we continued to attack them.

 

We could have waited and it would not have harmed us in the slightest. All the generals thought the war was over already

 

We could have done all sorts of goofy things. Japan hadn't surrendered yet and there was no reason to wait.

No one knew that at the time.

Aside from Ike, that's not what they were saying at the time.

 

It would not have harmed us at the time to wait and it would have not hurt us in any way. You have NO idea what the generals were saying at the time

 

Citations needed.

They were not war crimes and were legitimate necessary attacks

 

No they all did not think that no matter how much you pretend to claim they did.

Yes it would have done massive harm.

Invasion was a necessity and the toll on both sides would have been extraordinary. In addition the US was rapidly running out of money to fight the war with meaning we may well have stalled and been forced to walk away with Japan intact. They had to be crushed and defeated in no uncertain terms. The bombings were just a lucky break which brought them to the surrender table.

 

How would waiting another week or two have hurt us in the slightest?

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And yes they all thought the war was over and the bomb unnecessary

 

That is how you win wars and as I pointed out the financial crises was real and rapidly growing.

 

We could have waited a week and not have dropped a very expensive bomb. Besides all the generals said we didn't even need to

 

You are dreaming up an outright lie about the generals and yes it had to be ended by any means necessary and it did.

Justified moral and accpetable

 

I have posted many times the actual quotes of virtually every single military leader of that time and how they said we did not need the bomb. Want to try me?

 

Easy to say in hindsight.

Yes I do. Their words are part of the historical record.

 

Only in hindsight. Only Ike said such a thing before the surrender. And he only told a single person who didn't repeat it.

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Quotes that are part of a post-war budget fight do not count as quotes from during the war.